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Abstract 
This article reviews the social psychological literature on attentional focus and causal attributions as 
they apply to social phobia. Excessive self-focused attention is increased by physiological arousal, 
interferes with task performance under some conditions, increases the probability of internal attrib-
utions, and intensifies emotional reactions. Social anxiety is also associated with a reversal of the self-
serving bias for causal attributions. Implications of these findings for the maintenance and treatment 
of social phobia are discussed. 
 
Modern specialization within psychology often inhibits the cross-fertilization of ideas be-
tween clinical psychology and other specialties. Personality and social psychologists can 
contribute to our understanding of clinical syndromes by providing a knowledge base of 
the psychological processes and characteristics of normal individuals. Clinical researchers 
can then examine whether disturbed individuals act in similar ways under similar circum-
stances. Such comparisons may increase our understanding of behavior disorders and sug-
gest possible interventions. 
This paper examines how knowledge of two areas of social psychological research—
attentional focus and causal attributions—can enhance our understanding of social phobia. 
Excessive self-focused attention has been implicated in the development and maintenance 
of social anxiety by a number of theorists (Hartman, 1983; Schlenker & Leary, 1982). This 
paper will review the relationship between attentional focus and physiological arousal, 
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performance, attributions, and emotional reactivity. We will also examine how the causal 
attribution patterns of socially anxious individuals differ from those of nonanxious per-
sons and consider what implications this may have for the maintenance and treatment of 
social phobia. 
 
Self-Awareness and Social Anxiety 
 
Twenty years ago Argyle and Williams ( 1969) postulated that during any social interaction 
the individual must be aware of both the self and the other. If there is not an appropriate 
balance of these two perspectives, attempts at social interaction will be ineffective and may 
result in undesirable social outcomes. Sarason (1975) has suggested that for socially anx-
ious individuals, this balance is disrupted by a pattern of excessive negative self-referent 
thinking known as anxious self-preoccupation. Indeed, studies have found that social anx-
iety is associated with high frequencies of self-focused thoughts (e.g., Hope, Heimberg, 
Zollo, Nyman, & O’Brien, 1987; Johnson & Glass, in press). However, little is known about 
the role of excessive self-focused attention in social anxiety. As will be seen below, social 
psychologists have examined the causes and consequences of excessive self-focused atten-
tion in nonanxious individuals. The results raise some interesting hypotheses about the 
relationship between attentional focus and social phobia. Before reviewing specific studies, 
the various types of self-focus will be defined. 
Self-focused attention can result from both situational and dispositional factors (Buss, 
1980). Situational self-focused attention, known as self-awareness, may be induced by the 
presence of an audience, a mirror, or a video camera. The use of an audience to induce self-
awareness is most relevant to social anxiety, especially since an “audience” may be defined 
as the presence of one other person (e.g., Baumeister, 1984). The Self-Consciousness Scale 
(SCS) was developed to measure dispositional tendencies to focus attention on the self, 
referred to as self-consciousness (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975). Three factors are rep-
resented in the SCS: (a) private self-consciousness, an awareness of one’s own thoughts and 
feelings, (b) public self-consciousness, a general awareness of the self as a social object, and 
(c) social anxiety, discomfort in the presence of others. Self-awareness and self-consciousness 
have been studied extensively and appear to have similar effects on behavior (Buss, 1980). 
Public self-consciousness is thought to be more closely related to social anxiety than 
private self-consciousness. In fact, a number of researchers have proposed that social anx-
iety will not occur in the absence of public self-consciousness (Buss, 1980; Fenigstein, 1979; 
Schlenker & Leary, 1982). Although data from our laboratory have not supported this as-
sertion (Hope & Heimberg, 1988; Hope, Heimberg, & Grochowski, 1988), public self-
consciousness was positively associated with various measures of social anxiety. Further-
more, private self-consciousness appeared to be related to social anxiety via public self-
consciousness. Given the relatively large overlap between public and private self-consciousness 
in some samples (r = .54, Turner, 1978), including a sample of social phobics (r = .53, Hope 
& Heimberg, 1988), the effects of both types of self-consciousness will be considered below. 
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Self-Awareness and Arousal 
Several researchers have examined the relationship between attentional focus and physio-
logical arousal. Wegner and Giuliano ( 1980) hypothesized that an increase in salient inter-
nal stimuli, such as heart rate acceleration during physical exertion, would increase self-
focused attention. They demonstrated that fast running in place led to self-focus, presum-
ably because the salient physiological stimuli served to focus attention inward. When 
McDonald, Harris, and Maher (1983) proposed that it was the unusualness of running in 
place, not physiological arousal, that resulted in increased self-awareness, Wegner and 
Guiliano (1983) replicated their previous findings, controlling for unusualness of the activ-
ity. Subjects who had just ascended stairs (physiologically aroused) were more self-aware 
than students who had just descended the same stairs (not aroused). 
Like Wegner and Giuliano (1980, 1983), Fenigstein and Carver (1978) posited that 
awareness of physiological processes (e.g., heart beat) increases self-awareness. In their 
study, subjects were assigned to one of four conditions: heart monitoring apparatus with 
audio-feedback, heart monitoring apparatus without audio-feedback, no heart monitoring 
with background noise, no heart monitoring–no background noise. All four groups were 
then asked to make attributions about their responsibility for the outcome of various hy-
pothetical situations. The no-noise, noise, and heart rate monitoring without audio-feed-
back groups rated their personal responsibility equally, while the heart monitoring with 
audio-feedback group attributed significantly more responsibility to themselves than the 
other three groups. Fenigstein and Carver concluded that the presence of information con-
cerning one’s own physiological state led to a state of self-focus, which in turn resulted in 
self-attributions of responsibility. (The relationship between attentional focus and attribu-
tions will be discussed further below.) 
Although it appears that physiological arousal (or awareness of physiological pro-
cesses) leads to self-focused attention, the opposite does not appear to be the case. Carver 
and Scheier (1981) found that increased self-awareness (induced by a mirror) did not result 
in increased physiological arousal (as measured by Palmar Sweat Index). However, Carver 
and Scheier measured arousal while subjects copied German text. Perhaps heightened self-
awareness would have an impact on arousal in a more complex or evaluative task (such as 
public speaking, heterosocial interaction, or job interview). 
The relationship between physiological arousal and attentional focus has important im-
plications for social phobia. Many social phobics experience intense physiological arousal 
when exposed to anxiety-provoking events (Borkovec, Stone, O’Brien, & Kaloupek, 1974), 
and they may be painfully aware of their arousal. In fact, social phobics give very accurate 
estimates of their heart rate arousal in phobic situations, more so than other phobic indi-
viduals Johansson & Öst, 1982). Thus these data suggest that physiological arousal induces 
self-focused attention in social phobics who are then vulnerable to its effects on task per-
formance and emotional reactivity (see below). However, since social phobics vary in the 
degree of arousal they experience in their phobic situations (Heimberg, Hope, Dodge, & 
Becker, 1988; Öst, Jerremalm, & Johansson, 1981), excessive self-focused attention may be 
most problematic for those social phobics who experience more intense physiological re-
actions. 
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Self-Awareness and Task Performance 
According to limited-capacity attentional models (e.g., Wine, 1980) excessive self-awareness 
should result in performance decrements because the increase in self-attention leaves in-
sufficient attentional resources to focus adequately on the task at hand. Indeed, in work 
with test anxious subjects, Wine (1971) has demonstrated that an anxious response to test-
ing situations is associated with excessive test-irrelevant thinking, and that as test-anxious 
individuals are taught to focus more on the test, their performance improves. Similarly, 
subjects instructed to focus on a concept-attainment task performed better than subjects 
instructed to focus on themselves during the task (Brockner, 1979). Brockner also included 
the SCS and reported that high self-consciousness (total SCS scale score) was associated 
with poorer task performance, particularly when that performance occurred in the pres-
ence of a mirror. 
Baumeister ( 1984) reported a series of five experiments on the effects of self-consciousness 
and pressure on performance in a motor-coordination task. In the first two, self-attention 
(manipulated by instructions to self-focus) was detrimental to performance. In the third 
experiment, subjects high in private self-consciousness performed more poorly than low 
private self-conscious subjects, a finding which is consistent with the notion that self-
attention is detrimental to task performance. On the other hand, subjects low in public self-
consciousness performed more poorly than high public self-conscious subjects, especially 
when told to focus on themselves. In the fourth experiment, male subjects were led to be-
lieve that they had either done better (low pressure) or worse (high pressure) than a female 
confederate on the first trial of a task. High public self-conscious subjects did better than 
all other subjects, especially when being observed by the female confederate. Baumeister 
concluded that individuals low in dispositional public self-consciousness were more sus-
ceptible to choking under pressure because they were less accustomed to performing un-
der the pressure that is induced by being characteristically self-aware (high public self-
conscious). However, an alternative interpretation of these results deserves mention. Sub-
jects high in public self-consciousness, who by definition are very aware of themselves as 
social objects, may have been motivated to make a favorable impression and found the 
situation (performance of a motor-coordination task) a riskless medium in which to oper-
ate. In other words, the situation was not threatening enough for the detrimental effects of 
self-focusing to influence high public self-conscious subjects. Baumeister’s final experi-
ment supports the latter explanation. He approached individuals playing videogames in 
an arcade and offered to pay for their game if he could observe them. Although subjects 
were instructed to do the best they could, their scores decreased an average of 25 percent 
compared to pre-experiment levels. According to Buss ( 1980), the presence of the experi-
menter should have induced public self-awareness in the subjects. Also, the ambiguity and 
unusualness of the situation (being approached by a stranger who wants to watch your 
performance for his research) likely made it somewhat threatening. This combination of 
high public self-awareness and social threat inhibited performance. 
Stephenson and Wicklund ( 1984) examined the effects of self-consciousness on subjects’ 
ability to guide a blindfolded confederate through a maze task. The subject sat facing the 
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confederate so she was forced to adopt the confederate’s perspective when giving instruc-
tions (left, right , etc.). High private self-conscious women made fewer perspective-taking 
errors than low private self-conscious women. 
Obviously there is conflicting evidence about whether self-focused attention facilitates 
or debilitates performance. An early study by Liebling and Shaver (1973) may help explain 
the mixed findings. Liebling and Shaver had subjects copy Swedish prose in the presence 
or absence of a mirror. They also manipulated level of evaluation by telling half of the 
subjects that the task represented a measure of intelligence. The presence of the mirror 
facilitated performance in the low evaluation condition and reduced performance under 
evaluative conditions. Thus it appears that self-awareness is only detrimental when one’s 
motivation to perform well is high. 
In summary, it appears that instructions to focus on the task at hand facilitate perfor-
mance. The presence of self-focusing stimuli such as a mirror are detrimental to perfor-
mance but only if the subject is somehow vulnerable due to another factor such as social 
evaluation. Dispositional self-consciousness, on the other hand, has been inconsistently 
related to task performance. In some cases, high public or private self-consciousness is as-
sociated with superior performance, in other cases, with inferior performance. However, 
none of the studies cited above examined the effects of self-consciousness on performance 
at various levels of another variable such as self-esteem or social anxiety. Perhaps like mirror-
induced self-focused attention, the effects of dispositional self-consciousness are seen only 
in combination with a third variable. Recent data from our laboratory indirectly support 
this hypothesis. Hope et al. (1988) found a positive association between public self-consciousness 
and social anxiety (both measured with the SCS) but only for socially anxious subjects. 
Public self-consciousness and social anxiety were unrelated in nonanxious subjects. 
Burgio, Merluzzi, and Pryor (1986) also demonstrated that self-focused attention is det-
rimental only under some conditions. In this study male subjects, prescreened to be neither 
extremely high or low in social anxiety, interacted with a female confederate over the tel-
ephone either in the presence (high self-awareness) or absence (low self-awareness) of a 
video camera. Half of the subjects had high expectancies for success, half low expectancies. 
Low expectancy/high self-aware subjects talked less and had shorter conversations than 
low expectancy/low self-aware subjects. Furthermore, low expectancy subjects were rated 
as less skillful by judges than high expectancy subjects, but only when the video camera 
was present. High and low expectancy groups did not differ on skill ratings in the absence 
of the camera. In other words, self-focusing stimuli disrupted the performance of subjects, 
but only if they already lacked confidence in their social abilities. 
Given that, by definition, social phobics have low expectancies for success in social sit-
uations, one would expect that excessive self-focused attention would have detrimental 
effects on their performance in those situations. To our knowledge, only one study has 
examined attentional focus and performance among social phobics. Hope and Heimberg 
(1988) found that high public self-consciousness was associated with poorer performance 
on a behavioral test among social phobics awaiting treatment. Again, by definition the so-
cial phobics lacked confidence in their ability to perform socially and this, in combination 
with high public self-consciousness, appears to have disrupted their performance. 
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Self-Awareness and Emotional Reactivity 
Several studies have looked at the relationship between emotional reactions and self-
consciousness. Scheier and Carver ( 1977) found that both high private self-consciousness 
and the presence of a mirror intensified subjects self-reported reactions to pictures of nude 
women or violent atrocities. Mirror presence or high private self-consciousness also pre-
dicted greater elation and depression subsequent to reading affect-laden sentences. The 
authors concluded that mirror-induced self-awareness and self-consciousness resulted in 
increased attention to affective states, thereby intensifying self-report of affective reactions. 
Fenigstein (1979) extended these findings by examining the effects of self-focused atten-
tion on affective reactions to positive and negative social interactions. In the first of two 
studies, high public self-conscious women were more sensitive to interpersonal rejection. 
He suggested that attention focused on the self as a social object increased the salience of 
rejection and its subsequent implications for self-esteem. In the second experiment, sub-
jects were given either favorable or unfavorable feedback in an interview situation, and 
self-awareness was manipulated by exposing half the subjects to a mirror. Increasing self-
awareness (mirror present) heightened negative responses to negative feedback and 
tended to increase positive reactions to positive feedback. 
The results of the Scheier and Carver (1977) and Fenigstein (1979) studies suggest that 
self-awareness intensifies emotional reactions. A key aspect of social phobia is avoidance 
of noxious stimuli, that is, anxiety-provoking social interactions. If self-focused attention 
serves to heighten such aversive reactions, one would expect that self-focused attention 
would relate to avoidance behavior among social phobics. 
 
Focus of Attention and Causal Attributions 
A number of studies have found that the direction of attentional focus influences causal 
attributions. For example, if subjects are instructed to focus their attention toward one of 
the actors in a situation, they will attribute more responsibility for the outcome of that 
situation to that actor than to others in the situation (Taylor & Fiske, 1975). Similarly, one 
would expect that self-focused individuals would make more self-attributions than non-
self-focused individuals. A number of studies support this hypothesis. 
Duval and Wicklund (1973) found that subjects facing a mirror (high self-awareness 
condition) attributed more responsibility to themselves for the outcome of hypothetical 
situations than subjects who were not facing a mirror (low self-awareness condition). In 
another study, high private self-conscious subjects attributed more responsibility to them-
selves for the outcome of hypothetical situations than did low private self-conscious sub-
jects (Buss & Scheier, 1976). Public self-consciousness did not effect attribution patterns. 
However, as Buss and Scheier noted, the hypothetical situations used were not particularly 
social in nature. 
Fenigstein (1984) demonstrated that in social situations public, but not private, self-
consciousness influences expectancies for the outcome of situations. Groups of subjects 
were told that one of them had been randomly chosen for a demonstration for the group. 
The demonstration was described as enjoyable and interesting (positive) for half of the 
subjects and as discomforting (negative) to the other half. Subjects rated the likelihood that 
they would be chosen. Whether the expected outcome was positive or negative, subjects 
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high in public self-consciousness rated themselves as more likely to be chosen for the 
demonstration, a phenomenon dubbed “over-perception of self as target.” Private self-
consciousness was not related to this phenomenon. 
Thus it appears that self-focused attention is associated with internal causal attributions. 
However, the relationship between self-awareness and self-attributions may be mediated 
by a third variable—the success or failure of the outcome. In a study by Federoff and Har-
vey (1976), subjects delivered relaxation instructions to confederates in the presence or ab-
sence of a video camera. A meter provided false feedback clearly indicating success or 
failure of the instructions. When subjects were self-aware (presence of a camera), they 
made internal attributions for success and external attributions for failure. In fact, when 
they expected success but failed, they tended to blame the confederate. Non-self-aware 
subjects did not differ in their attributions for success and failure. Federoff and Harvey 
suggested that in such an unfamiliar situation the presence of the camera aroused subjects’ 
self-esteem concerns which resulted in a self-protective attributional pattern known as the 
self-serving bias (see below). 
It should be noted that one study failed to find a relationship between attentional focus 
and attributions. Ellis and Holmes (1982) instructed subjects to focus either on themselves 
or on an interviewer during an interaction and then had them rate to what extent their own 
behavior, the situation, and the personality of the interviewer were responsible for the in-
terviewer’s behavior. It was predicted that the subject’s focus of attention would determine 
causal attribution. However, the focus of attention manipulation did not influence causal 
attributions for the behavior of the interviewer. 
In summary, it appears that self-focused attention is related to over-perception of the 
self as target and self-attributions. Thus social phobics’ over-perception of themselves as 
the focus of others’ observation (noted by Butler, this issue) may reflect excessive self-
focused attention. Furthermore, if social phobics are self-focused, they are likely to attrib-
ute the outcome of social situations to themselves . Given that socially anxious individuals 
have a selective memory for negative interpersonal feedback (O’Banion & Arkowitz, 1977) 
and are overly sensitive to such feedback (Smith & Sarason, 1975), these self-attributions 
will often be for failure. 
 
Causal Attributions and Social Anxiety 
 
Over the years social psychologists have identified a phenomenon known as the “self-serving 
bias” in causal attributions. According to the self-serving bias, people tend to attribute suc-
cess to internal causes such as skill or ability and to attribute failure to external causes such 
as bad luck or task difficulty (cf., Miller & Ross, 1975). Zelen (1987) proposed that a reversal 
of the self-serving bias may underlie what he calls the “performance neuroses,” a group of dis-
orders which includes social anxiety. A number of studies suggests that the self-presentational 
concerns of socially anxious individuals cause reversal of the self-serving bias. 
Using a methodology similar to the one employed by Federoff and Harvey (1976) in the 
study described above, Arkin, Appelman, and Burger (1980) compared the attributions for 
success or failure of high and low socially anxious subjects. Subjects acted as therapists in 
a mock desensitization session and received false feedback on the success or failure of their 
H O P E ,  G A N S L E R ,  A N D  H E I M B E R G ,  C L I N I C A L  P S Y C H O L O G Y  R E V I E W  9  (1 9 8 9 )  
8 
intervention. Level of evaluation was manipulated by having half the subjects believe their 
report of the session would be reviewed by a committee of psychologists immediately after 
the intervention and that they would be present at the review, while the other subjects 
were told a committee would review their report at a later date and that they would not 
be present at the review. All subjects were videotaped (comparable to the high self-aware 
condition in Federoff and Harvey). Nonanxious subjects followed the typical self-serving 
bias. They attributed more responsibility to themselves for positive than for negative out-
comes, a replication of the high self-aware condition in Federoff and Harvey. However, 
socially anxious subjects did the reverse. They took more responsibility for failure than 
success, particularly when evaluation was imminent. Arkin et al. suggested that the anx-
ious subjects adopted a “cost” orientation toward the committee evaluation. They felt the 
committee would be less displeased if they took responsibility for the failure. On the other 
hand, the nonanxious subjects adopted a “reward” orientation; if they took responsibility 
for a positive event and made it seem they had nothing to do with a negative event, they 
would impress the committee. 
Teglasi and colleagues (Teglasi & Fagin, 1984; Teglasi & Hoffman, 1982) have produced 
additional data suggesting that social anxiety is associated with reversals of the self-serving 
bias. Teglasi and Hoffman ( 1982) compared subjects who responded to an advertisement 
recruiting shy people placed in a university paper with volunteers from a psychology class. 
The subjects made attributional ratings for social and task-oriented scenarios which had 
either positive or negative outcomes. Shy subjects took more responsibility for negative 
outcomes and less responsibility for positive outcomes than nonshy subjects. Interestingly, 
this attributional pattern was only found for the social scenarios, suggesting the reversal 
of the self-serving bias is situation-specific. Using a different methodology, Teglasi and 
Fagin (1984) essentially replicated their earlier findings. Girodo, Dotzenroth, and Stein (1981) 
also reported that high but not low social self-esteem was associated with a reversal of the 
self-serving bias when subjects made attributions for the success and failure of heterosocial 
events. 
One study (Miller & Arkowitz, 1977) failed to support the notion that social anxiety 
influences causal attributions for social outcomes. High and low socially anxious male sub-
jects were asked to have two five-minute conversations with a female confederate, who 
was instructed to be either warm or cold. Miller and Arkowitz hypothesized that high so-
cially anxious individuals would attribute failure (confederate coldness) to themselves and 
success (confederate warmth) to the situation, but that low socially anxious subjects would 
do the reverse. However, the required interaction effect was not significant. 
Miller and Arkowitz’s study differed from the studies that did find reversals of the self-
serving bias in that it utilized actual interactions (rather than written scenarios) without 
concrete feedback on success or failure (unlike Arkin et al., 1980). There is evidence that, 
under such conditions, anxious subjects may not adequately perceive the differences be-
tween friendly and aloof confederates. Heimberg and colleagues (Heimberg, Acerra, & 
Holstein, 1985) found that socially anxious subjects failed to distinguish between similar 
and dissimilar potential interaction partners, although a preference for similar others had 
been repeatedly demonstrated in nonanxious subjects (Bryne, 1971). In another study, 
Hope, Heimberg, and Klein (in press) asked high and low socially anxious women to recall 
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information about their interaction partner and the content of the conversation following 
a moderately structured heterosocial interaction. Anxious subjects recalled less infor-
mation and made more recall errors than nonanxious subjects. Both of these studies sug-
gest that exposure to an anxiety-provoking interaction disrupts the social information 
processing of anxious individuals. Thus, Miller and Arkowitz’s subjects may have failed 
to distinguish between an aloof and friendly confederate. Consequently, their attributions 
did not differ for the two types of interactions. Unfortunately, Miller and Arkowitz did not 
provide adequate detail in their report to examine the validity of this hypothesis. 
 
Implications for Social Phobia 
 
In summary, it appears that self-focused attention: (a) is increased by physiological arousal, 
(b) interferes with task performance if the person is somehow made vulnerable by another 
factor such as low self-esteem or low expectancies, (c) may increase the probability of in-
ternal attributions, and (d) intensifies emotional reactions. High social anxiety is associated 
with a reversal of the self-serving bias of causal attributions. Applying these concepts to 
social phobia leads to the following scenario: Physiological arousal when entering an anxiety-
provoking situation leads to increased self-focus and concern that arousal is visible to oth-
ers (McEwan & Devins, 1983). Given the already low expectancy for success, the social 
phobic’s self-focus interferes with his or her performance which may lead to negative feed-
back from the interaction partner. Even if no negative feedback is given, overperception of 
the self as target induced by self-focused attention may cause the social phobic to make 
internal attributions for neutral or ambiguous feedback. The less than ideal outcome is then 
attributed to himself or herself. Throughout the encounter, increased self-focus heightens 
the social phobic’s perception of the aversiveness of the situation which may increase the 
probability he or she will avoid similar situations in the future. At any point, increased 
physiological arousal would be expected to heighten self-awareness which, in turn, exac-
erbates the other effects. Finally, any interaction that is perceived as successful would be 
discounted by attributing the success to external causes. Thus reversal of the self-serving 
bias helps maintain the disorder in spite of experiential evidence disconfirming social phobics’ 
low expectancies for success. The self-presentational model of social anxiety (Schlenker & 
Leary, 1982) may help explain why social phobics engage in this particular attributional style. 
According to Schlenker and Leary, social anxiety occurs when a person desires to make 
a particular impression but doubts he or she will be successful. Recently, Leary and Ather-
ton (1986) further defined the doubt portion of the model and emphasized the importance 
of low self-efficacy in social anxiety. Low self-efficacy, in combination with social phobics’ 
tendency to overperceive themselves as the focus of others’ attention, may make the rever-
sal of the self-serving bias a viable strategy for impression management. If the individual 
fails in a social interaction, others will undoubtedly notice. Therefore it is better to 
acknowledge the failure than to make a second blunder by not recognizing the first failure. 
If a social interaction proceeds successfully, then the social phobic will not want to take 
credit for the success out of fear that others will then expect equally effective performance 
in the future. Thus, the reversal of the self-serving bias serves as a self-handicapping strat-
egy designed to minimize the damage to self-presentational goals in the current situation 
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and reduce others’ expectancies in future situations. In fact, self-handicapping among the 
socially anxious has been reported by a number of researchers (e.g., Baumgardner & Brown-
lee, 1987; Snyder & Smith, 1986). 
The importance of attributions in social anxiety is further underscored by studies that 
show that the effects of social anxiety are diminished when an external attribution for po-
tential poor performance is provided. For example, telling socially anxious subjects that 
background noise would interfere with their conversation with a confederate produced 
less heart rate reactivity (change from baseline) during the initial minute of an interaction 
than when they were told the noise would not interfere (Leary, 1986). Nonanxious subjects 
did not react to the noise manipulation. Subjects giving speeches exhibited fewer speech 
dysfluencies when they were told that their arousal was attributable to subliminal noise 
compared to subjects for whom the noise explanation was not offered (Olson, 1988). Inter-
estingly, neither study found effects for misattribution on self-report measures of anxiety. 
 
Implications for Treatment of Social Phobia 
 
The issues discussed above have a number of implications for the treatment of social pho-
bia. First, excessive self-focused attention likely contributes to the cognitive and behavioral 
deficits associated with the disorder. Therefore, treatment strategies that reduce self-
focused attention should be effective interventions. Given that physiological arousal in-
creases self-awareness, interventions aimed at reducing arousal, such as relaxation train-
ing and some pharmacotherapies, should be particularly useful with physiologically 
reactive social phobics . Alternatively, Hartman ( 1983) has suggested that excessive self-
focused attention can be reduced directly by teaching clients strategies that redirect their 
attention to the interaction partner(s) or the situation. Secondly, we have noted a number 
of cognitive distortions which may be amenable to cognitive-behavioral techniques. These 
distortions include overperception of the self as the focus of others’ attention, excessive 
internal attributions, particularly for failure, and excessive external attributions for suc-
cess. The latter distortion , discounting their role in successful social experiences, is partic-
ularly dysfunctional in that it does not allow social phobics to gain confidence following 
positive interactions. Not only does this help maintain the disorder prior to treatment but 
it can sabotage treatment efforts as well by maintaining low expectancies for successful 
social interaction. In fact, Alden ( 1987) demonstrated that socially anxious subjects were 
unwilling to accept positive feedback following a social interaction and discounted the 
feedback by attributing it to unstable factors. Therefore, clinicians must be alert to social 
phobics’ tendency to make external or unstable attributions for improvement. 
In conclusion, social psychologists’ studies of attentional focus and causal attributions 
can facilitate our understanding of social phobia. However, the majority of the studies re-
viewed in this article utilized analogue populations. Clearly more research is needed with 
clinical samples. The work of social psychologists helps us know which questions merit 
“attentional focus” and offers tested methodologies to employ in finding the answers. 
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